

# LETTER

FROM AN

London. 67

# ELECTOR

OF THE

BOROUGH of Great Yarmouth in the  
County of Norfolk,

TO

Mr. HORATIO WALPOLE,

One of the Representatives in Parliament for that  
Borough, and Ambassador to the Court of France;

CONCERNING

The Stipulation in the SEVILLE TREATY for introducing Spanish  
Troops into Tuscany, Parma and Placentia.

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They who know well the State of the Nation, the Load of the Publick Debt, the Difficulty of laying new Taxes, and the Expence of a War, will readily be of Opinion, a War should, if possible, be prevented; and were we not under these particular Circumstances, no honest and wise Minister will be forward to draw a Nation, especially a Trading Nation, into a War, the Issues of which must always be uncertain, more particularly under a Confederacy.

Treaty of Seville impartially considered, p. 9.

They (the Ministers) wisely considered, that a War, if possible, was to be avoided, in the Situation Affairs were in, from Circumstances that would have been peculiar to it; a War, in which we might suffer much, but could not our selves tell what to wish for. We knew not what it was we could either do our selves, or wish were done by our Allies; and whoever considers Things coolly, must needs be of the same Opinion. For Example; Could we wish France should recover in Flanders what was at so vast an Expence of Men and Money taken from them in the last War? Could we wish them to extend their Conquests on the Rhine, where the Circles bordering upon it are already all Weakness, and utterly unable to defend themselves.

Id. p. 16.

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# LETTER


FROM AN

## ELECTOR

OF THE

Borough of GREAT-YARMOUTH, &c.

SIR,



Have been a constant Reader of all the Papers or Pamphlets that, for the last four Years, have been published to justify the Conduct of Great-Britain: I have likewise as constantly perused the several Performances

mances on the other Side of the Question; and I am so far from believing that the Authors of the latter intended the Instruction of *Foreign Courts*, or to throw *Difficulties* in the Way of our own *Measures*, that I think I could my self undertake to collect from them several Particulars, about which the Event hath since proved the Truth of their Sentiments; and which therefore, it is now to be wished, had been more taken Notice of by some of their own Countrymen. I chuse however to confine my self at present to some Reflections lately published upon one Particular, about which if it hath been possible for us to have mistaken our own Interest, it may not perhaps be yet too late to disengage our selves.

The Author of a Pamphlet, entituled, *Observations on the Treaty of Seville examined*, hath, to my Conviction, fully proved, that the Introduction of Spanish Troops into the Italian Dominions stipulated by that Treaty, is a Variation from the *Quadruple Alliance*, which greatly affects the Rights and Interest of the Emperor. Nor will it, I believe, be pretended, that the present apparent Sense of the Court of Vienna, upon this Subject, is formed from the Writings

tings of that Gentleman. They have the *Quadruple Alliance* in their Hands, and cannot but very well remember, that the *Neutrality* of the Troops to be introduced was kept in View by all the Parties to it as a Point of the *utmost Consequence*. They may read it to have been, in the *fifth Article* of that Treaty, *solemnly stipulated*, " that any of the said Duchies and Estates neither can, nor ought ever at any Time, or in any Case whatsoever to be possessed by any Prince, who shall be at the same Time King of *Spain*, and that a King of *Spain* can never undertake, and have the *Tutelage* of the same Prince. That it is agreed by all and every the contracting Parties, and *they are alike engaged*, that, during the Lives of the present Possessors of the Duchies of *Tuscany* and *Parma*, or their Male Successors, neither the Emperor, the King of *France*, the King of *Spain*, nor the Prince designed for this Succession, shall introduce any Soldiers of whatever Nation, of their own Troops, or others in their Pay, into the Places or Countries of the said Duchies, or establish *Garrisons* in the Towns, Ports, Citadels and Fortressses there situated.

Nor can it be upon this Gentleman's Authority alone, that they are now likely to consider Spanish Garrisons introduced into Parma, Placentia, Porto Ferraio and Leghorn, as so many Places of Arms put into the Hands of an old Enemy, an unfaithful Ally, and a certain Rival, or apprehend, that neither Pretences nor Means will be wanting to introduce greater Numbers of Spanish, and even of French Troops into the Heart of Italy; and to serve the Emperor, as Ferdinand the Catholick served Lewis the Twelfth in Consequence of the Silly Partition, to which the latter consented. Or if these Fears are in themselves reasonable, if the Imperialists have a War in Italy to apprehend, whether they do or do not agree to the Treaty of Seville as it now stands, will their Politicians want the Advice of our Authors to determine them, whether it is their Interest to enter upon it before, or after, the Introduction of Spanish Troops?

But I beg Leave to go farther than the Author now before me, who seems to admit that Spanish Troops, though improper to secure the Feodality of the

the *Empire*, and upon many Accounts to be apprehended by the Court of *Vienna*, are however proper to secure the Succession to *Don Carlos*. It is my Opinion that they are improper even for this Purpose, and therefore that, for this Reason above all others, the Design and Consequences of the Variation in Dispute are greatly to be apprehended by the Imperialists.

This Apprehension of mine, I think, may be supported, not only by the Quadruple Alliance, but, what I must confess I am much surprized at, by the Authority of the late Seville Treaty. But let it first be tried by the common Sense of Mankind, without Regard to either of them.

Do we not suppose that a Provision for the second Family of the King of *Spain*, the Children of the present Queen of *Spain*, who hath appeared for some Years to have so much Influence at that Court, to have been principally intended in the Settlement made of these *Italian* Dominions in Favour of *Don Carlos*, and the Male Descendants of this Queen? If this is true, if these are the present

Favourites

Favourite Views of the Queen of *Spain*, by what  
*Arts* hath it been possible to persuade her that  
*Spanish Troops* (which so much alarm the *Empe-  
ror*) are a proper Security for the Succession of her  
own Family to Dominions allowed to be *Fiefs of  
the Empire*, and in a Case where it is so evidently  
the Interest of her own Family to possess a Sov-  
reignty in them *independently* on the Crown of  
*Spain*? That Princess must surely know, what  
almost every Man in *Europe* is aware of, the  
Contingencies, to which her present Influence in the  
Councils of *Spain* remains liable. Or, if these  
were out of the Case, she may die, or the present  
*King of Spain* may die, and, in both Cases alike,  
the Interest of her Family be left at the Mercy of  
very different Councils from those, which now *seem*  
to prevail at that Court. Is there no Danger from  
these Contingencies, to happen at any Time dur-  
ing the Lives of the Princes now in Possession of  
these Dominions, of finding them, by the Assis-  
tance of Troops in the *Pay*, and under the *Com-  
mand* of the Crown of *Spain*, in the Event united  
to that Crown, and her Descendants disappointed  
in their Expectations of that Sovereignty in them,  
which

which it is now proposed to secure to them? I think this is an Event, which it is the Interest of that Princess, from a Regard to her own Family, as much to guard against, as any other that it can have been proposed, by either of the above-named Treaties, to secure her from.

And against this Event, the Quadruple Alliance is Effect, and the Treaty of Seville in Words, have plainly guarded. By the express Words of the Quadruple Alliance, no immediately following what I have quoted from thence above, Neutral Troops are agreed to be put into Garrison in these Dominions, in Order to procure a still greater Certainty, against all Sort of Events, to the said Son of the Queen of Spain, designed by this Treaty to succeed to the Great Duke of Tuscany, and the Duke of Parma and Placentia, and to render more certain the Execution of what is promised him as to the said Succession, as well as to put out of all Danger the Feodality established in the said Estates in Favour of the Emperor and the Empire, &c.

The Eleventh Article of the Treaty of Seville, in the translated Copy of it printed by Mr. Buckley, is in these Words: "The Intent of introducing the said Six Thousand Men of his Catholick Majesty's Troops, and in his Pay, being to secure to the most Serene Infante *Don Carlos* the immediate Succession of the States of *Tuscany, Parma and Placentia*, his Catholick Majesty promises, as well for himself as his Successors, that as soon as the most Serene Infante *Don Carlos* his Son, or such other who shall succeed to his Rights, shall be the quiet Possessor of those States, and in Safety from all Invasion and other just Grounds of Fear, he will cause to be withdrawn from the Places in those States, the Troops which shall be his own, and not belonging to the Infante *Don Carlos*, or to him who shall succeed to his Rights, in such manner that thereby (*de sorte que par la*) the said Succession or Possession may rest secure and exempt from all Events.

The Reader will soon perceive, in this Article, the Crown of Spain obliged to withdraw their Troops for the Security of Don Carlos, when in Possession of these Dominions. Strange! that the same Persons, who have discovered that it was for his Security, when in Possession, that the Spanish Troops should leave him, should seem so little to think whether it was for his Security, that it should be in the Power of Spanish Troops, to keep him out of these Dominions.

I confess I have for some Time wished, that in order to an Accommodation with the Court of Spain, some Advances had been made on our Side towards assisting them to secure this Succession of *Don Carlos*, in Consequence of Engagements so long since entered into in their Favour. I have sometimes thought, that something like *justice* as well as our own *Interest* should, at a proper Time, have persuaded to it. But I never thought there was any Reason for derogating from the Treaty of London for this Purpose; or that any Thing was farther necessary for the Satisfaction of the Court of Spain in

this Particular, than some new Stipulations, between our Court and that of France, for carrying those Provisions in that Treaty, which relate to the Italian Succession, into Execution. A Capitulation with 6000 Swiss Troops, grounded on the Quadruple Alliance, I always thought practicable. After which our Assistance, in introducing them out of Hand had been, as I conceive, more for the Security of the present Queen of Spain's Family. By this Step therefore it seems to me, that we might have succeeded as effectually in an Accommodation with the Court of Spain, and yet have avoided a Quarrel with the Emperor.

In this Light the Interest of the Court of Spain appears to me at the Time of concluding the Seville Treaty; though I can most sincerely profess, that I desire to find myself mistaken. For if I am not, surely it is proper for us to consider what farther Design, than securing the Succession to *Don Carlos*, is to be served by the Introduction of Spanish Troops. Can it have been intended as an Occasion of a War with the Emperor, or of weakening that Prince in any Part of Europe by French Conquests?

Conquests? I hope not, and the Gentlemen who justify the late Treaty, I think, almost assure us, that the *Emperor* must, for his own Safety, acquiesce in this Part of it. Perhaps this is true, but if it is so, it is still more plainly true, for the same Reason, that after the Introduction of Spanish Troops, and unless we ourselves fall in to his Assistance, he must submit to whatever farther Designs Spain may have formed upon his Italian Dominions. No, say the same Writers, the Emperor hath always Troops enough in Italy to keep Six Thousand Spaniards in Order. But this is evidently not the Point in Question. The Emperor is to guard against those greater Numbers of French or Spanish Troops, which this Number of Troops will plainly open the Way for. Or, if the Emperor had no Reason for any Apprehensions of this kind, with what Modesty can it be pretended that, after the Introduction of Six Thousand Troops into the Neighbourhood of his Italian Dominions in the Pay of an old Competitor, he will not find himself obliged to increase whatever Number of Troops he before thought sufficient alone for his own Security.

And

And to what a Degree must the just Apprehensions of the *Imperialists* be increased, if they have indeed Reason to suppose, that any Thing farther than the Security of *Don Carlos*, was intended by this Part of the *Seville Treaty*? They may indeed perceive that *We* can have no *National Interest* in destroying that Ballance of Power in *Europe*, which, to bring about, hath already cost us so many Millions. But a *Neighbouring Power*, whose growing Credit in Politicks, I hope, is not at the Expence of ours, will find their Account in it *immediately*, if they can persuade us to it, or even to sit still tied down by Treaties with them, whilst they do it.

I have been principally induced to communicate these Sentiments from hoping that we have it still in our Power to make up our present Differences with the *Emperor*, and to the Satisfaction of the *Spanish Court*, by returning to the *Treaty of London*, as to the *Neutrality* of the *Italian Garrisons*. If not, while I keep in view the *different Interest* of the Allies of *Seville*, I can by no means survey the Strength of that Confederacy with the Satisfaction which

which a Writer expresses upon discovering that we are *four to one*, in the present Controversy against the *Emperor*. Nor can I forbear with great Submission, proposing it to be considered, Whether, if any Time hereafter it may be thought proper in imitation of our Neighbours, to derogate from solemn Treaties, it may not be at the same Time convenient to keep more closely to their Example, by doing so for our own Advantage, and not for theirs only.

I am

Great-Yarmouth,  
Mar. 25, 1730.

SIR, &c.

